On February 26, 1991, the Commander of
the Allied Forces, General Norman Schwarzkopf directed “Send in the
First Team. Destroy the Republican Guard. Let’s go
home.” And like General MacArthur before him, he requested that the
545th MP’s lead the way. The division charged west pausing only to
refuel before passing through breeches in the enemy obstacle belt.
Racing north and then east, the division moved in a vast armada of
armor, stretching from horizon to horizon. Within 24 hours,
the First Team had gone 300 kilometers, slicing deep into the
enemy’s rear. As the division prepared to destroy a Republican
Guard Division, the cease fire halted it.
During all this activity, the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd platoons of the 545th MP Co. were with their respective
Brigades while the 4th Platoon provided security for the Division
Main Command Post (D-Main) and the 5th Platoon remained with the
Division Tactical Operations Center (D-TOC). Each of the
platoons with the Brigades operated the EPW Forward Colleting Point
for that brigade and these facilities were never static for too long
as the division kept constantly on the move. The 4th Platoon
maintained and operated the Division Central EPW Collection Point as
well as security for the 545th MP Co headquarters and the office of
the PMO in the vicinity of D-Main.
With the advent of the Global Positioning
Device, the days where most of the Division MP’s were out in front
of the division to guide them on their way have past. No
longer do the division MP’s have to be the best map readers in the
division – no longer do the forward area TCP’s hold the POW’s or
EPW’s as they are called today for turn over to an Escort Guard
Company. In this war the platoons with the brigades remained
basically in the Brigade Support Areas and sent squads forward as
requested, to escort EPW’s back to the Forward Collecting Point(s)
and then subsequently to transport them back to the Division Central
Collecting Point utilizing empty transport trucks. In this war that
was a monumental task as the Iraqi soldiers surrendered as fast as
the 545thth MP’s could transport them. In 100 hours the Iraqi
Army went from being the 4th largest Army in the world to the 2nd
largest Army in Araq!
The 545th MP Company set up defensive
positions where the cease fire had stopped their forward movement
and attack, then expanded north to Highway 8, clearing bunkers and
looking for enemy equipment and soldiers.
Within two weeks the 545th MP Company
moved south into Saudi Arabia and its new assembly area (AA)
Killeen. There on the plain of the Wadi al Batin – the 545th
MP’s began to prepare for their redeployment home.
Addressing the division and the 545th MP
Co at AA Killeen on Palm Sunday, VII (US) Corps Commander, Lt. Gen.
Frederick Franks emphasized the division’s major role in the allied
victory. “You were leading the corps – you were the major
combat power VII Corps had. You were the First Team. You
led us into combat. You began the fight, you led the way ….”

545th MP’s Lead the Way
Again
In an email to Sam Reinert from Ltc. Jeff
Harris sent on 11/24/05, the activities of the 545th MP Company
during Desert Storm are documented clearly. Ltc. Harris
commanded the 545th during Desert Storm and LTC Byrd was the 2nd
platoon leader at the time. Both are members of the 545th MP
Co. Association. At the writing of this document, Ltc. Harris
is attending the Naval War College.
“Sam:
The 2nd Platoon, 545th MP Co. was in
direct support of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Blackjack
Brigade) at this point, and as I recall, the Platoon Leader (Robert
Byrd) advised me that they were asked to cover the left flank of the
brigade as it moved north deeper into Iraq. This job is
usually given to a Cav. or Mechanized Infantry unit. The
platoon had Global Positioning Systems at the time which was just
coming into use. With the mobility and firepower available to
them, I believe the Brigade commander felt comfortable with the idea
that they were the right force to accomplish that critical mission –
the company and this particular platoon had a very good reputation
in the division. I remember vividly 1Lt. Byrd bringing the 2nd
Brigade battle plan to my headquarters and briefing me prior to the
division moving into Iraq. It struck me at the time that it
was going to be a slug fest and our MP’s were going to be heavily
involved – especially in EPW and rear area security – this concerned
me, because the bypass criteria for our tank battalions stated that
it was permissible to bypass platoon sized armor if it appeared that
they were not going to fight. You might contact Ltc. Robert
Byrd and get clarification of the exact placement of the 2nd MP
platoon. Understand that at this point, I had two platoons
deep in Iraq, a platoon sitting on the DMAIN in north Saudi Arabia,
a platoon running the width of the battlefield with the DTAC right
behind 1st and 2nd Brigades and a platoon supporting Tiger Brigade
with the Marines on the east coast heading to Kuwait City. The
action you mentioned could have happened (a many thing do) on the
move and certainly the platoon leaders had the latitude to support
their brigades as the needed to without getting approval from
Company.
Hope this helps,
Jeff”

Further Details on the push
into Iraq by the
545th MP Company
In an email from Ltc. Robert Byrd to Sam
Reinert, dated 24 November 2005, further details emerge regarding
the activities of the 545th MP Co. in Desert Storm. The
following is a copy of the text of that email:
“Sam,
During the Brigade Support
Area's (BSA)move north into Iraq, 2 PLT did screen on either flank
to protect the BSA from possible counter attack from by-passed
units. As you can imagine, the BSA is a big slow group of
Sustainment HQs and vehicles designed to reconstitute the maneuver
brigade when it gets where it is going. By doctrine the BSA moves
behind the maneuver brigade anywhere from 10-20 km. The amount of
risk that the brigade commander is willing to assume by leaving the
BSA relatively unprotected is of course based on mission, enemy,
troops and time available (MET-T). In this case the brigade
commander (COL House) assumed a great deal of risk but it turned out
in his favor as we had no significant incidents with our BSA.
LTC Robert K. Byrd
Deputy Brigade Commander
16th Military
Police Brigade (Airborne)”
